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We investigate the utility of Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen correlations of the position and momentum
of photon pairs from parametric down-conversion in the implementation of a secure quantum key
distribution protocol. We show that security is guaranteed by the entanglement between down-
converted pairs, and can be checked by either direct comparison of Alice and Bob’s measurement
results or evaluation of an inequality of the sort proposed by Mancini et al. (Phys. Rev. Lett. 88,
120401 (2002)).
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I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum communication protocols using photonic
qubits have been proposed and implemented, utilizing
entanglement in several degrees of freedom of the photon
[1]. Perhaps the most promising application of quantum
communication using photons is quantum key distribu-
tion (QKD) [1,2], in which entangled or single qubits are
sent from sender to receiver(s) and used to establish a
secret random key string, which can then be used to se-
curely transmit a data string. Most QKD schemes are in-
spired by the original single-qubit BB84 [3] or entangled-
qubit Ekert [4] protocols. In the BB84 protocol, crypto-
graphic security is provided by the partial indistinguisha-
bility of non-orthogonal states and the no-cloning theo-
rem, while the security of the Ekert protocol is guaran-
teed by violation of Bell’s inequality. For photon pairs,
obtained from spontaneous parametric down-conversion
(SPDC), entanglement in polarization [5] and energy-
time [6] have been most widely and sucessfully used.
There have also been QKD proposals based on con-
tinuous variable field quadratures of multiphoton beams
[7]. Again, security of these protocols is based on either
measurement of non-commuting observables and the no-
cloning theorem or violation of some classical inequality.
In this paper, we present a protocol for QKD based
on the position and momentum degrees of freedom en-
tangled photons created by SPDC. Recently, it has been
shown that the difference between the positions of entan-
gled SPDC photons along with the sum of their momenta
are Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) correlated, or, in
other words, entangled [8]. These correlations are in-
teresting not only for their direct relation to the seminal
paper by EPR [9], but also for their possible application
to quantum information tasks. To our knowledge, the
work we present here is the first quantum information
protocol based on position and momentum entanglement
of the form originally proposed by EPR. Entanglement
in position and momentum is easily obtained, since it is
a direct consequence of the inherent phase matching con-
ditions in the parametric process. Moreover, it has been
demonstrated that it is possible to protect this type of
entanglement against divergence due to free-space trans-
mission of the down-converted photons [10]. Therefore
quantum key distribution in position-momentum vari-
ables could be a promising application.
In section II we present the QKD protocol, and discuss
basic security issues in section III. Section IV shows ex-
perimental results confirming the utility of position and
momentum EPR correlations in QKD.
II. THEORY
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FIG. 1. Diagram of quantum key distribution using po-
sition and momentum variables of down-converted photons.
The SPDC source emits photons entangled in position and
momentum. Lenses are used to create the image (posi-
tion measurments) or Fourier transform (momentum mea-
surements) in Alice and Bobs detection planes. THe 50-50
non-polarizing beam splitters (BS) are used to choose ran-
domly between position and momentum measurements.
Fig. 1 shows a diagram of the basic QKD apparatus.
The protocol works as follows. Twin photons are created
by a SPDC source. One photon of each pair is sent to
Alice (A), and one to Bob (B). At each of Alice and
Bob’s stations, a random selection between detection in
the position (x) or momentum (p) basis is performed by a
50-50 non-polarizing beam splitter (BS). A measurement
in the x basis is easily performed by a lens imaging the
crystal onto the detection plane. It is well known that
a measurement in the p basis can be implemented by a
lens with crystal and detection planes in its focal planes
[11], as was done in Refs. [8].
Before any photons transmitting potential key bits are
exchanged, Alice and Bob calibrate their x detectors for
positions Ax1 and Ax2 and Bx1 and Bx2, and their p
detectors at positions Ap1 and Ap2 and Bp1 and Bp2,
respectively. Let us assume that, in both bases, detector
position “1” (“2”) represents the 0 (1) logical level. From
the multimode theory of SPDC [10,12], it is possible to
show that, for ideal point-like detectors, the probability
to detect photon pairs is
Pxx(ρA,ρB) ∝ |W (αρA + βρB) δ (αρA − βρB)|
2
(1)
for a position-position (xx) configuration. The notation
“ij” refers to the situation where Alice measures in the i
basis and Bob in the j basis, where i, j = x, p. HereW is
the field profile of the pump beam at the crystal face. We
define the parameters α ≡ OA/(2IA) and β ≡ OB/(2IB),
which are related to the magnification factors of Alice’s
and Bob’s imaging systems. We have also assumed that
both imaging lenses have been placed so as to obey the
thin lens equation. The delta function appears due to the
fact that we have considered ideal point-like detectors.
Since the pump beam profileW can be made much larger
than the delta function, it is possible to find positions ρA
and ρB such that W is approximately constant.
Similarly, for a momentum-momentum (pp) configura-
tion,
Ppp(ρA,ρB) ∝
∣∣∣∣v
(
kA
f
ρA +
kB
f
ρB
)∣∣∣∣
2
, (2)
where v is the angular spectrum of the pump beam at
the crystal face. If they measure in the same basis, Alice
and Bob can calibrate their detectors so that they see a
large correlation in their coincidence measurements. For
example, if Alice detects a photon at Ax1, then the prob-
ability for Bob to detect a photon at Bx1 will be much
greater than the probability to detect a photon at Bx2.
In general, Alice and Bob can choose positions such that
P (Ax1, Bx1) ≈ P (Ax2, Bx2) >> 0 (3)
P (Ax1, Bx2) ≈ P (Ax2, Bx1) ≈ 0, (4)
where P (A,B) is the coincidence detection probability.
The same is true for measurements in the p basis:
P (Ap1, Bp1) ≈ P (Ap2, Bp2) >> 0 (5)
P (Ap1, Bp2) ≈ P (Ap2, Bp1) ≈ 0. (6)
Moreover, Alice and Bob can adjust their detection
systems such that P (Ax1, Bx1) ≈ P (Ax2, Bx2) ≈
P (Ap1, Bp1) ≈ P (Ap2, Bp2). In the interest of simplic-
ity, we will remove the subscripts on the probabilities Pij
whenever redundant.
The security of the QKD protocol is conditioned on the
fact that the correlation is low when the measurements
are performed in different bases, so that very little infor-
mation is shared. For example, if Alice detects a photon
at Ax1, then the probability for Bob to detect a photon
at Bp1 should be the same as the probability to detect a
photon at Bp2. Using the standard theory of SPDC, the
coincidence detection probability for an xp configuration
is
Pxp(ρA,ρB) ∝ |W(αρA)|
2, (7)
while a px configuration gives
Ppx(ρA,ρB) ∝ |W(βρB)|
2. (8)
There is no correlation in the detection probabilities (7)
and (8). Thus, Alice and Bob can choose their detec-
tor positions such that P (Ax1, Bp1) = P (Ax1, Bp2) =
P (Ax2, Bp1) = P (Ax2, Bp2) = P (Ap1, Bx1) =
P (Ap1, Bx2) = P (Ap2, Bx1) = P (Ap2, Bx2).
To generate a secret key, Alice and Bob perform a se-
ries of measurements on a number of photon pairs until
they have accumulated N coincidence events, where N
depends on the size of the key and the level of secu-
rity required. All events in which only one or neither of
them detect a photon are discarded. After the N photon
pairs have been detected, Bob, through classical commu-
nication, informs Alice of his measurement basis (x or
p) for each photon. On average, Alice and Bob mea-
sure in the same basis 50% of the time. They keep these
photons and discard the rest. Alice then chooses m of
the remaining photon pairs at random and tells Bob to
reveal his measurement result. She then uses these pho-
ton pairs to check for an eavesdropper by comparing her
measurement results with those of Bob. The presence
of an eavesdropper is registered by a deterioration of the
quantum correlation observed in the xx or pp coincidence
events. If the error rate is below a given threshold, then
Alice and Bob can be sure that any eavesdropper has ob-
tained an insignificant amount of information about the
secret key. They can then use classical privacy amplifica-
tion and information reconciliation protocols to increase
security and reduce errors in the key [13].
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III. SECURITY
We will now discuss the security of this protocol. There
has been much work in security proofs for a wide vari-
ety of attacks on QKD systems [2]. We will limit our
discussion to incoherent attacks, in which the eavesdrop-
per (Eve) has access to one photon pair at a time. Here
we provide a security argument for a simple attack, and
leave more complex attacks for future work.
If Eve steals one or both photons, then no coincidence
is detected, the event is discarded and no information
is obtained by Eve. One way for Eve to obtain infor-
mation is based on an intercept-resend type strategy [2],
in which she steals one or both photons, measures (and
thus destroys) them, and then replaces them with new
photons. We note here that we call this type of gen-
eral attack, in which Eve can measure in any basis, as
an intercept-resend “type” strategy, in contrast to the
usual intercept-resend strategy found in the literature in
which Eve measures in Alice and Bob’s bases. As in the
BB84 or Ekert protocols using qubits, in this attack Eve’s
presence is marked by a deterioration of the correlation
in Alice and Bob’s measurements.
One method of testing security is through the quantum
bit error rate, which can be defined as a function of the
“wrong” and “right” detection probabilities [2]:
QBER =
P wrong
P wrong + P right
. (9)
In order to simplify the analysis of our experimental re-
sults, we will not assume that P wrong+P right = 1. With
no eavesdropper present, in our notation the QBER is
given by
QBER0 =
∑
j=x,p
s6=t∑
s,t=1,2
P (Ajs,Bjt)
∑
j=x,p
∑
s,t=1,2
P (Ajs,Bjt)
. (10)
There are many different attack strategies that Eve
can adopt [2]. As an example, let us consider that Eve
implements the usual intercept-resend strategy on Bob’s
quantum channel. Let us suppose that Eve is completely
aware of Bob’s detection system and has constructed
an identical one of her own, and denote Rij(ρA, ρE)
as the coincidence detection probability for Alice and
Eve, where i, j = x, p. Then, Alice and Eve’s detec-
tion probability is the same as that of Alice and Bob:
Rij(ρA, ρE) = Pij(ρA, ρB). She intercepts and measures
Bob’s photon, giving one of the following results: Ex1,
Ex2, Ep1, Ep2 or a null count. She then prepares a pho-
ton in the eigenstate corresponding her measurement re-
sult and sends it to Bob. We will consider only the cases
where Eve detects a photon. Then, for a given photon
pair, Alice, Bob and Eve detect photons with probability
Pijk(ρA, ρB, ρE) = Rik(ρA, ρE)pj(ρB; k), (11)
where i, j, k = x or p, pj(ρB; k) is the probability that
Bob will detect Eves replacement photon in basis j given
that it was prepared in basis k, and we now limit our-
selves to the cases where ρA, ρB and ρE are one of
Alice, Bob or Eve’s pre-defined measurement positions
(Ax1,. . . , Bx1. . . , Ex1, . . . ). If Eve chooses the same
measurement basis as both Alice and Bob, then she can
go essentially undetected, since
Piii(ρA, ρB, ρE) = Rii(ρA, ρE) = Pii(ρA, ρB), (12)
which is the detection probability that Alice and Bob ex-
pect. Here we have assumed Eve’s best-case scenario, in
which, given that she is completely aware of his detection
system, she can replace Bob’s photon in such a way that
pi(ρB ; i) = 1. However, if Eve chooses the wrong basis,
then, for the cases in which Alice and Bob expect a large
detection probability Pii(ρA, ρB):
Piij(ρA, ρB, ρE) = Rij(ρA, ρE)pi(ρB; i) ≤ Pii(ρA, ρB),
(13)
when i 6= j. This follows from the fact thatRij(ρA, ρE) =
Pij(ρA, ρB) < Pii(ρA, ρB) and pi(ρB ; j) ≤ 1. In other
words, the eavesdropping reduces the correlation between
Alice and Bob’s measurements. Similarly, if Eve inter-
cepts the pair of photons by another equally entangled
pair, she is essentially playing the role of the source and
the protocol is not affected [14]. If she replaces the pair of
photons by non- or less-entangled photons, then similarly
the correlation between Alice and Bob’s measurements is
reduced and Eve’s presence can be detected.
Assuming that Eve measures every one of Bob’s pho-
tons in a basis (x or p) chosen at random, the QBER for
Eve’s intercept-resend strategy is
QBER =
∑
j=x,p
s6=t∑
s,t=1,2
P (Ajs,Bjt) + χ
∑
i,j=x,p
2∑
s,t=1
P (Ajs,Bjt)
, (14)
where
χ =
j 6=k∑
j,k=x,p
2∑
s,t=1
pj(Bjt; k)P (Ajs,Bjt) (15)
is the error due to Eve’s disturbance when she mea-
sures in the wrong basis. Here we have assumed that
R(Ajs,Ejt) = P (Ajs,Bjt).
From the argument above it is demonstrated that
eavesdropping reduces the correlation between Alice and
Bob’s measurements, and that this correlation is guaran-
teed by an EPR-like state. The EPR character can be
demonstrated, as in Ref. [8], by satisfying the inequality
[15]:
∆2(Axi −Bxi) ∆
2(Apj +Bpj) ≤
~
2
4
. (16)
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To check for the presence of Eve, Alice and Bob can ei-
ther check the correlations between m pairs of their N
measurement results by calculating the QBER, or use
these m pairs to verify Eq. (16).
IV. EXPERIMENT
FIG. 2. Experimental arrangements used to test correla-
tions in position and momentum degrees of freedom. For
position measurements a lens is used to image the face of
the non-linear crystal (NLC) onto the detection plane, while
for momentum measurements both the crystal face and the
detection plane lie at the focal points of a lens (see text).
We have performed measurements which demonstrate
the security of a QKD protocol using position and
momentum variables by testing the correlations be-
tween position-position and momentum-momentum co-
incidence detections, as well the non-correlation between
position-momentum and momentum-position detections
in a typical twin photon set-up. The experimental con-
figuration is shown in Fig. 2. We use a femto-second
pulsed Ti-Sapphire laser doubled by a 2 mm long BBO
crystal, obtaining a violet beam with wavelength cen-
tered around 425 nm. Using the violet beam to pump
a 1 cm long Lithium Iodate crystal, down-converted sig-
nal and idler photons were produced and detected in dif-
ferent wavelengths with interference filters centered in
890 nm with 10 nm bandwidth and 810 nm with 50 nm
bandwidth. We use avalanche photodiode single photon
counting modules equiped with short focal length lenses
(often called objective lenses, because the focal lengths
are short, but they play the role of oculars) and a thin slit
at the entrance. The slits are oriented so that the hor-
izontal dimension is 3 mm and the vertical dimensions
are 0.2 mm for position measurements and 0.5 mm for
momentum measurements. When detection is performed
in the position basis, the crystal face is imaged by a 15
cm focal length lens placed 20 cm from the crystal. The
detectors are placed 60 cm from the lenses, giving a mag-
nification factor of 3, which allows us to image a narrow
region with the 0.2 mm detection slits. The pump beam
is a Gaussian beam with spot size ≈ 2 mm at the crystal
face. For measurements in the momentum basis, a 15 cm
focal length lens is used and the detectors are placed 30
cm from the crystal face, so that the crystal plane and
the detection plane coincide with the focal planes of the
lens.
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FIG. 3. Experimental results for xx configurations.
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FIG. 4. Experimental results for pp configurations.
Results of the experimental investigations are dis-
played in Figs. 3 - 6. All curves are Gaussian fits and er-
ror bars represent errors due to Poissonian photon count-
ing statistics. In all measurements detector A was kept
fixed while B was scanned linearly in the vertical direc-
tion. Setting detectors A and B for position measure-
ments, we expect to see a large correlation in coincidence
measurements. Fig. 3 shows the coincidence count rate
when detector B is scanned along the vertical axis and
detector A is fixed at position Ax1 (triangles) and also
when A is fixed at Ax2 (circles). The peaks of the coinci-
4
dence distributions are separated by about 1 mm, which
is also the separation between Ax1 and Ax2, implying a
good position correlation. The width of these distribu-
tions is basically defined by the convolution of the slit
apertures in both detectors [12].
Fig. 4 shows the coincidence count rate when mo-
mentum measurements are performed at both stations.
Detector B was scanned while detector A was fixed at
Ap1 (triangles) and Ap2 (circles). Ap1 and Ap2 are sep-
arated by 1 mm and the separation between the coinci-
dence peaks is about 1 mm, showing a good momentum
correlation. The widths of these curves also depend on
the overlap between the detection apertures, as the mo-
mentum measurement is actually mapped onto measure-
ments of the detector positions.
To show that the two-photon state is indeed EPR cor-
related, we calculate the variances in inequality (16) us-
ing data from Figs. 3 and 4, obtaining
∆2(Ax1 −Bx1) = (0.152± 0.003)mm
2,
∆2(Ax2 −Bx2) = (0.080± 0.002)mm
2,
∆2(Ap1 +Bp1) = (0.912± 0.017)~
2mm−2,
∆2(Ap1 +Bp1) = (0.875± 0.90)~
2mm−2. (17)
These values give an average of ∆2x∆
2
p = (0.10± 0.02)~
2,
which satisfies inequality (16) by about 5 standard devi-
ations.
The security of our QKD protocol is based on a
large correlation when measurements are performed in
the same basis and low correlations when measurements
are performed in complementary bases. The measure-
ments in Figs. 3 and 4 show that the correlation be-
tween position-position measurements and momentum-
momentum measurements are very high. Now we are go-
ing to demonstrate that the correlation between position-
momentum and momentum-position is negligible.
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FIG. 5. Experimental results for xp configurations.
The coincidence profile for the xp configuration is
shown in Fig. 5. Here detector B is scanned in the p
configuration with detector A fixed at Ax1 (triangles)
and Ax2 (circles). There is no correlation between Alice
and Bob’s measurements in this case since the coinci-
dence profile is approximately constant for all positions
of detector B, as expected from Eq. (7). The slight “en-
veloping” visible in the coincidence counts is due to a
small modulation in the single counts as detector B is
scanned (not shown). Detector A positions Ax1 and Ax2
were chosen so that the coincidence rate is approximately
the same for both cases. We will show below that this
is necessary to guarantee the security of the distributed
key.
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FIG. 6. Experimental results for px configurations.
Fig. 6 shows the coincidence profile for the px config-
uration, where B is scanned in the x basis with detector
A fixed at Ap1 (triangles) and Ap2 (circles). As expected
from Eq. (8), the coincidence count rate reproduces the
transverse intensity profile of the pump field as a func-
tion of Bob’s detector position only, which shows that in
this case there is no correlation between Alice and Bob’s
measurements.
TABLE I. Coincidence counts for Alice and Bob’s chosen
detector positions.
Bob/Alice Ax1 Ax2 Ap1 Ap2
Bx1 943± 31 72± 8 700± 26 655 ± 26
Bx2 67± 8 1079 ± 33 671± 26 765 ± 26
Bp1 462± 21 492 ± 22 956± 31 22± 5
Bp2 614± 25 591 ± 24 29± 5 876 ± 30
5
Using the results in Figs. 3 - 6, Bob can choose his
detector positions so that the security conditions dis-
cussed in section II are best satisfied. Examining the
figures, it is most advantageous to define Bx1 = 1mm,
and Bx2 = 2mm, Bp1 = 1mm and Bp2 = 2mm. Table
I shows the coincidence counts for every possible mea-
surement at Alice and Bob’s stations, from which it can
be seen that the correlation between measurements in
the same basis and the non-correlation between measure-
ments in different bases. There is a slight discrepency
among the on-diagonal coincidence count rates. A fine-
tuning of the coincidence levels can always be acheived
by using neutral filters in front of the detectors so that
the on-diagonal terms are approximately equal.
From Table I and Eq. (10), the QBER in the absence of
an eavesdropper would be QBER0 = 0.047± 0.001. The
QBER for xx measurements is QBERxx0 = 0.064± 0.001
and QBERpp0 = 0.027± 0.001 for pp measurements. The
security criterion for most QKD protocols is a QBER of
less than about 0.15 [2]. For a QBER above this limit
it is impossible to establish a secret key, even with one-
way error correction and privacy amplication. Since our
QBER is much lower than this limit, it should be possible
for Alice and Bob to establish a secure secret key.
We can use the xp and px measurement results to pre-
dict the effect of an eavesdropper. Using the results in
Table I in Eq. (14), the estimated QBER if Eve were
to measure every one of Bob’s photons in a randomly
chosen basis (x or p) would be QBER = 0.296 ± 0.001
where we have assumed that pj(Bjt; k) = 1/2 for all t
and j 6= k in Eq. (15). In other words, we have assumed
that if Eve measures in the wrong basis, she has a 50%
chance of sending the “correct” replacement photon. We
see that Eves presence is clearly marked by an increase
in the QBER.
V. CONCLUSION
Recent work [8] has shown that photon pairs created
by spontaneous parametric down-conversion exhibit en-
tanglement in position and momentum, of the sort orig-
inally proposed in the fundamental paper by Einstein-
Podolsky-Rosen [9]. Here we have extended these ideas
by experimentally investigating the implementation of a
quantum key distribution protocol based on the quantum
correlations between position and momentum of entan-
gled photon pairs. In addition to interest due to the rela-
tion with historical debates on Quantum Theory, quan-
tum key distribution based on position and momentum
of photon pairs might offer some advantages. First, using
these degrees of freedom allows for the use of long non-
linear crystals, therefore opening the possibility of hav-
ing really high flux entangled-photon sources. Second,
it might be possible to extend these results to higher di-
mensional systems, which could be used in quantum com-
munication protocols such as quantum bit commitment
[16].
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